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BOOK REVIEWS

Privilege and Creative Destruction: The Charles River Bridge
Case. By Stanley I. Kutler. (Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott Com
pany. 1971. Pp. 191. $5.95.)
Private Interest and Public Gain: The Dartmouth College Case,
z8z9. By Francis N. Stites. (Amherst: The University of Massa
chusetts Press. 1972. Pp. v, 176. $9.50.)
The two cases discussed and analyzed separately in these books
have generally been handled in tandem by American constitu
tional historians. Mention of either one has more often than not
inexorably led to inclusion of the other. The cases are viewed as
symbolic of the transition from the Marshall Court to the Taney
Court. The Dartmouth College case is often considered as the
doctrinal forerunner of the Charles River B ridge case, while, on
the other hand, the Charles River Bridge case is viewed as modify
ing the holding in the Dartmouth College case. And so one might
expect that separate books dealing with such seemingly similar
themes must be at least akin and possibly analagous in approach
or treatment. But, with a few exceptions, the contrary is true.
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The exceptions only serve to tantalize one with the potentiali
ties inherent in the study of individual judicial cases (and, one
would hope, eventual comparative analysis). Both works are or
ganized along the same lines. The narratives take one from the
genesis of the struggle to its conclusion, and along the way first
relate the facts and events essential to the determination of the
causes, then structure and interpret the lawyers' arguments and
the judicial opinions, and finally examine the ultimate impact of
the decisions. Stites though seems satisfied merely to let the events
unfold while only occasionally offering an insight into what really
might be at stake, while Kutler's chapters are rich with analysis
in addition to recounting the tale carefully. In short, Kutler
brings to the writing of American constitutional history some of
the methods, techniques, and perspectives that Willard Hurst in
troduced to the writing of American legal history. And the fresh
approach stands in sharp contrast to Stites's traditional reliance
on narrative and his dogged attempt to rationalize doctrinal in
consistencies that just might be almost inexplicable.
The contrast in substance is once again highlighted by an ap
parent congruence in form. Kutler titled his work "Privilege and
Creative Destruction" and effectively integrated these ideas into
his discussion of the case. Stites's title invokes "Private Interest
and Public Gain"-a striking parallel, one might add (perhaps
unkindly), to Kutler's earlier formulation. If we equate "Privilege''
with "Private Interest" and "Creative Destruction" with "Public
Gain" (in the latter case, as one suspects Chief Justice Taney
would have), we would be presented with an ideal opportunity
(based on what the titles announce) to indulge in comparative
analysis of the cases for ourselves. Unfortunately, we are left to
conjecture as well as to analyze, for while Kutler delivers as prom
ised, Stites never really tells us what his statement of "Private
Interest and Public Gain" in relation to the Dartmouth College
case means.
All this is not to say that Stites has not done a competent job
within the limits and framework he chose. It is only to question
those limits, and to suggest that Kutler's attempt to examine "the
law's functional context and the interrelationship between law
and society, rather than merely the abstract, embryonic growth
of particular doctrines" is a more valuable and useful historical
approach. Stites's examination is workmanlike and shows impres-
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sive evidence of having been thoroughly researched. Some might
argue too well-researched-offering a ratio of text to footnotes of
113 pages to 44 pages. (One sometimes gets the feeling that Stites's
citations, though not presenting one with information one ought
not to know, borders on supplying one with information one
might not need to know.) As a result, a conscientious attempt to
follow the footnotes often severely interrupts the reading, and
what once might be termed copious and complete documentation
deteriorates into a cumbersome device. Nothing is excluded, but
unfortunately Stites draws too few conclusions from his mass of
arrayed sources. The Dartmouth College case (with the possible
exception of the Dred Scott case) is probably the most discussed,
cited, and written about case in antebellum America. It is not
clear that all we need at this juncture is simply a more complete
version of the story. In contrast, Kutler has essentially eschewed
footnotes and documentation. The uninitiated occasionally might
suffer under this scheme, and even the expert familiar with the
sources might wonder where some of Kutler's quotations may be
found. (Kutler's hints in his bibliographical essay may not prove
enough.) But Kutler's plan in presenting an unimpeded render
ing of the case, with its attendant analysis, ultimately justifies it
self. While I would not recommend Kutler's style for broader
studies, his choice of format certainly does not detract from his
effective argument.
In fairness to Stites, it may not be possible to produce the type
of substantive analysis and draw the kinds of conclusions about
the Dartmouth College case that Kutler did with the Charles River
Bridge case. As Kutler notes, the Charles River Bridge case was
"a landmark involving the interrelationship of public policy,
technological change, capital developments, competition, and
law." Its impact on the economic development of the United
States is a matter for empirical proof. Occurring at a time when
railroads were vying to replace turnpikes and canals as the most
efficient means of transportation and communication, the Supreme
Court's decision inserted a measure of order into a situation that
threatened chaos. A conflict between an old established toll bridge
on the verge of being sacrificed to a newly chartered free bridge,
one located near the other, was easily translatable into a broader
context. But what of a direct legislative alteration of a corporate
charter that evolved from a series of disputes between a cantanker-
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ous college president and a body of less than submissive trustees.
Is the Dartmouth College case so different from the Charles River
Bridge case as to lend itself to a totally different mode of analysis?
Could Stites have asked some of the same questions Kutler did?
Probably so.
Instead of spending so much time attempting to preserve doc
trinal symmetry and seeking to unravel the mysteries of the con
tract clause as so many have valiantly sought to before him, Stites
could have asked some potentially revealing questions. Did the
Dartmouth College case holding actually serve to encourage in
fant business as has been so often suggested in the past? What was
the real effect in the competitive marketplace of the supposed
sanctity of corporate charters? Did legislatively imposed reserva
tion clauses in charters effectively limit corporate power and
"vested rights" in advance of the Charles River Bridge holding?
Was the state's ability to plan or initiate action at all hindered by
the Dartmouth College case? What impact did the public/private
dichotomy have on the development of legal principles in the
subsequent thirty years? Of course, there are many other interest
ing questions that need answering. But the few suggested above
might have lifted Stites's work out of the conventional presenta
tion of the case.
American constitutional historiography seems to be in a period
of narrowing interests. Broader themes are ignored, or when
tackled invariably extrapolated out of relatively limited and con
fined cases, periods, and even constitutional clauses. It can cer
tainly be argued that all such scholarship is merely providing the
foundation for more general work to follow. But the descent into
particularity has not yielded much yet in the way of broader
studies. A history of the United States Supreme Court is underway
now that is divided into arbitrary periods governed essentially by
the appointment and death of various chief justices. Its results may
lead one eventually to conclude that the whole is after all not
always equal to the sum of all its parts. In the cases of Stites and
Kutler, we are faced with a striking example of the disparate re
sults a relatively narrow focus can yield. Perhaps the solution is as
simple as stating that Kutler asked the better questions.
ALFRED
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